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ABSTRACT
Recently, the Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana
overruled almost twenty years of precedent by striking down the
adverse inference doctrine, which had created a negative
presumption against any alleged patent infringer for failing to
obtain and disclose a patent opinion letter at trial. The decision,
while strongly supported by numerous intellectual property and
business associations, has created uncertainty for patent attorneys
regarding the use of opinion letters in litigation and the acceptable
methods for proving willful infringement. This iBrief addresses two
specific questions left unanswered by the decision. It concludes
that (1) Federal Circuit precedent strongly suggests that the
plaintiff may inform the fact-finder that the alleged infringer failed
to consult legal counsel, and (2) willful infringement findings can
probably be avoided even absent an opinion from counsel, as long
as the alleged infringer makes a showing of good faith intent to
avoid infringement.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Businesses and universities are placing greater and greater
importance on creating and defending intellectual property.2 This increased
attention to intellectual capital, particularly patents, is reflected by dramatic
increases in the number of patents issued3 and patent lawsuits filed in the
United States over the last several years.4 Another indication of the
increasing value associated with patents is the size of recent patent
infringement verdicts. Many infringement verdicts today extend into the
1
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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
3
Id. (“The number of U.S. patents issued to both U.S. and foreign entities nearly
tripled from 66,290 in 1980 to 184,172 in 2001.”).
4
Id. at 32 (“The number of patent lawsuits settled in or disposed by federal
district courts doubled between 1988 and 2001, from 1,200 to nearly 2,400.”).
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millions of dollars.5 These multi-million dollar awards often result from the
addition of enhanced damages to already substantial actual damages.
However, the infringer is only liable for enhanced damages if the fact-finder
determines the infringement was willful.6 Unsurprisingly, virtually every
infringement charge comes coupled with a willfulness charge due to the
possibility of obtaining greatly enhanced damages.7
¶2
The Supreme Court has defined willfulness as “conduct that is not
merely negligent.”8 In the context of a patent case, this means the infringer
has knowledge of an existing patent he is likely to infringe by the
development of his own product.9 The purposes of finding willful
infringement and the subsequent award of enhanced damages are meant to
punish infringers for deliberately breaking the law10 and to make the policy
statement that patent infringement is “disfavored.”11 Deterrence for willful
behavior by infringers can include treble damages12 and an award of
attorney fees.13

However, in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v.
Dana Corp.,14 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
made willful infringement easier for infringing defendants to conceal by
eliminating one of the primary tools employed by courts and plaintiff’s
attorneys to prove willfulness – adverse inference. Prior to Knorr-Bremse,
failure by a party accused of infringement to either obtain or disclose an

¶3

5

See e.g., Eric Young, Patents Spell a Hot Market – For Lawyers, EAST BAY
BUSINESS TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003 (“Consider recent judgments against eBay Inc.
for $29 million, Microsoft Corp. for $521 million and Research in Motion Ltd.
for $53 million.”), available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2003/09/15/focus4.html.
6
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]his court
has approved [enhanced damages] where the infringer acted in wanton disregard
of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful.”); Ira V.
Heffan, Willful Patent Infringement, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 115, 119 (1997) (“An
infringer is liable for actual damages even if the infringement was unintentional,
but the infringer is not liable for enhanced damages without a finding of
willfulness”).
7
Heffan, supra note 6, at 115-16.
8
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486
U.S. 128, 133 (1988)).
9
State Indus., Inc. v. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10
Heffan, supra note 6, at 118.
11
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
12
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed”).
13
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
14
383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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opinion letter15 from legal counsel resulted in an adverse inference that such
an opinion would have been negative for the infringing party.16 Such a
presumptive finding by the court often damaged the accused infringer’s case
and resulted in a finding of willful infringement.17 In Knorr-Bremse,
however, the court explicitly overruled its prior precedent and held “that no
adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been
unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce
an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”18
¶4
The decision in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate adverse inference, while
widely advocated by many intellectual property groups,19 created a number
of uncertainties for patent litigators. Commentators seem convinced the
decision will change patent law,20 but many are unsure how the changes will
play out. As Judge Dyk pointed out in his partial dissent in Knorr-Bremse,
the majority provided little guidance about the future role of opinion letters
in patent litigation.21 The majority itself mentioned, but failed to resolve,
the question of “whether the trier of fact, particularly the jury, can or should

15

Opinion letters, or exculpatory opinions, are legal memoranda typically
created by patent attorneys to advise clients about the “validity, enforceability,
and infringement of a patent.” David O. Taylor, Wasting Resources: Reinventing
the Scope of Waiver Resulting from the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to a Charge
of Willful Patent Infringement, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 319, 326 (2004). In
order for the opinion letter to be valid, “the opinion must be competent, timely
obtained and reasonably relied upon by the accused infringer.” Thomas
Presson, Knorr-Bremse and Questions About Production of an Exculpatory
Legal Opinion and the Adverse Inference, 44 IDEA 409, 417 (2004).
16
See, e.g., Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding defendant’s silence on the subject of legal advice warranted a
finding that the advice would have been negative).
17
See William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and
Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 419 (“[Adverse] inference is a virtual
deathblow to the defendant’s case.”).
18
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341.
19
See, e.g., Brief for the Association of Patent Law Firms as Amicus Curiae at
*3, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at
2003 WL 23200560; Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Patent Foundation at *12,
Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at 2003
WL 23200569.
20
See Steve Seidenberg, Patent Ruling May Boost IP Boutiques, 3 No. 39
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 (October 1, 2004) (“Many expect that the court’s en banc
ruling in Knorr-Bremse … will simplify patent infringement suits, improve the
relationship between patent counsel and their clients, and give boutique patent
law firms a leg up in their competition with large general-practice firms.”).
21
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1352 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissentingin-part).
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be told whether or not counsel was consulted (albeit without any inference
as to the nature of the advice received) as part of the totality of the
circumstances relevant to the question of willful infringement.”22 Finally,
commentators have questioned how potential infringers can avoid a finding
of willfulness without an opinion of counsel.23
¶5
This iBrief will address these uncertainties created by the KnorrBremse decision. It will begin by tracing the historical development of
adverse inference. The iBrief will then present the Knorr-Bremse decision
and examine the effects of the decision on current patent law. Finally, the
iBrief addresses two specific questions left unanswered by the Federal
Circuit’s decision: (1) May the plaintiff inform the fact-finder that the
alleged infringer failed to consult legal counsel? (2) How can potential
infringers avoid a finding of willful infringement in the absence of
obtaining an opinion from legal counsel? The iBrief concludes that factfinders may still be informed of the failure by potentially infringing parties
to consult counsel, but potential infringers may rebut an allegation of willful
infringement, despite the absence of an opinion from counsel, by
demonstrating that they made a good faith effort not to infringe.

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERSE INFERENCE
¶6
The adverse inference doctrine developed during the formative
years of the Federal Circuit. Early on, the court recognized that a potential
infringer “has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether
or not he is infringing” when he has “actual notice” of another inventor’s
patent rights.24 Originally, the court held that fulfillment of this duty
depended on the potential infringer obtaining “competent legal advice from
counsel” before initiating any potentially infringing activity.25 However, in
subsequent decisions the court relaxed the requirement to consult counsel in
every case, stating fulfillment of the “affirmative duty will normally entail
the obtaining of competent legal counsel before infringing or continuing to
infringe.”26 Yet, while proof of competent legal advice may provide
evidence a potential infringer fulfilled his duty of care, it does not act as a

22

Id. at 1346-47.
See, e.g., Marcus S. Friedman and Barry J. Marenberg, A Sharp Turn in the IP
Highway: The Federal Circuit Redefines Willful Patent Infringement, 178 N.J.
L.J. 29 (Oct. 4, 2004); Doug Elliot, Putting the Brakes on Adverse Inference,
9/27/2004 TEX. LAW. 29 (Sept. 27, 2004).
24
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that an example of actual notice includes the results of a
patent search).
25
Id. at 1390.
26
Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (emphasis added).
23
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complete bar to a finding of willful infringement.27 Likewise, failure to
obtain any legal opinion does not necessarily create a mandatory finding of
willfulness, so long as the potential infringer had no knowledge of any
existing patent rights.28 Instead of adopting one of these pro se rules
regarding legal advice, the court reasoned a finding of willful infringement
should not be based on a single failure on the part of the defendant, but
rather on the “totality of the circumstances presented.”29
¶7
Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit introduced the doctrine
of adverse inference in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford
Co.30 While that court did not ultimately apply the adverse inference
doctrine, it did suggest that failing to present any opinion from counsel at
trial “may indeed lead to negative inferences.”31 The Federal Circuit first
applied adverse inference in Kloster Speedsteel v. Crucible.32 In that case
evidence suggested the defendant knew its “high speed” tool steel would
infringe the plaintiff’s patent,33 but proceeded to import and sell the
infringing steel anyway.34 Adhering to prior precedent, the court applied
the “totality of the circumstances” test in deciding the issue of willfulness.35
One component of the test was the defendant’s failure to assert “it sought
advice of counsel when notified of the allowed claims and [the plaintiff’s]
warning or at any time before it began this litigation.”36 According to the
court, the defendant’s “silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on the
attorney-client privilege, would warrant the conclusion that it either
obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its importation
and sale of the accused products would be an infringement of valid U.S.
patents.”37 In this particular case the court’s decision to challenge the
defendant’s reliance on attorney-client privilege almost certainly resulted

27

Cent. Soya Co., Inc. v. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“While we recognize that counsel’s opinion on validity is evidence to be
weighed towards a determination of good faith, it is not dispositive.”).
28
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
30
Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the
Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 80 (2001)
(citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
31
Id. at 80 (quoting Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 628.).
32
793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
33
Id. at 1570.
34
Id. at 1580 (“Stora proceeded with its infringement on the assumption, as
stated in the memorandum and found by the district court, that the patents were
valid and would be infringed.”).
35
Id. at 1579.
36
Id. at 1580.
37
Id.
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from the skeptical nature of the defendant’s defense. Yet adverse inference
was not an anomaly relegated to this particular instance, for it has since
become a major part of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
Perhaps recognizing the serious implications of abrogating the
attorney-client privilege, the Federal Circuit clarified the application of
adverse inference in a subsequent case. In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,38
the court opined that “the weight that may fairly be placed on the presence
or absence of an exculpatory opinion of counsel has varied with the
circumstances of each case, and has not been amenable to development of a
rigorous rule.”39 The court thus implied that a finding of adverse inference
would only be appropriate under certain fact patterns.40 Turning to the case
before it, the court determined the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s
patent.41 However, despite the defendant’s claim of attorney-client
privilege and refusal to present an opinion of counsel, the court refused to
impose a finding of willful infringement.42
¶8

¶9
In other cases, the court continued to apply adverse inference. In
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co.,43 the court endorsed the
doctrine of adverse inference stating, “[w]here the infringer fails to
introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to
infer that either no opinion was obtained, or if an opinion were obtained, it
was contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of a
patentee’s invention.”44 As in Kloster, the defendant in Fromson was found
liable for willful infringement.45

II. THE KNORR-BREMSE DECISION
The contrasting findings in Rite-Hite and Fromson demonstrate that
the Federal Circuit did not uniformly apply the adverse inference doctrine.
Furthermore, the application of adverse inference varied greatly by
jurisdiction.46 Coupled with these inconsistencies in the doctrine’s

¶10

38

819 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1125.
40
Id. (“Although in appropriate circumstances this court has upheld the drawing
of adverse inferences on the question of willfulness, we have observed that
“[t]here is no per se rule that an opinion letter from patent counsel will
necessarily preclude a finding of willful infringement””).
41
Id. at 1124.
42
Id. at 1125.
43
853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
44
Id. at 1572-73.
45
Id.
46
See Lori Goldstein, et al., Federal Circuit Re-evaluates Adverse Inference
Rule, 15 NO. 12 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 12, 12 (2003) (observing that the District
Court of the Northern District of Ohio declined to apply adverse inference when
39
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application, the concept of forcing litigants to waive the attorney-client
privilege faced serious opposition from various attorneys’ groups47 and led
to the proliferation of vague and unhelpful legal advice.48 In response to
these criticisms the Federal Circuit decided to re-hear Knorr-Bremse en
banc in order to re-evaluate the propriety of adverse inference.49

A. Knorr-Bremse Background
Knorr-Bremse, the plaintiff company, developed a particularly
effective type of air disk brake for use with large commercial vehicles.50
Based in Germany, Knorr-Bremse marketed its air disk brakes primarily to
European truck companies.51 Recognizing the potential market for air disk
brakes in the United States, Dana, an American corporation, and Haldex, a
Swedish company, the alleged infringers, agreed to collaborate to
manufacture and sell an air disk brake in America.52 Eventually, Dana and
Haldex developed the Mark II and began installing them on some large
commercial vehicles in the United States.53 Upon learning of the Mark II,
Knorr-Bremse filed an infringement suit against Haldex in European court
and shortly thereafter filed an infringement suit against Dana and Haldex in
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.54
¶11

¶12
In the district court, Knorr-Bremse moved for summary judgment
for literal infringement55 by the Mark II brake.56 After a hearing the district

a defendant refused to disclose a patent opinion, citing attorney-client privilege
(citing W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1628 (N.D.
Ohio 1989)).
47
See, e.g., Corrected Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae
at *2-6, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at
2003 WL 23200567; Brief for Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property
Law Association at *2-3, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 021256), available at 2003 WL 23200554.
48
Robert P. Taylor & Katharine L. Altemus, But the Lawyers Said it was Okay
… Revisiting the Role of Legal Opinions in Patent Litigation, 801 PLI/PAT 761,
763 (2004).
49
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Literal infringement is where an accused product or process contains all the
elements described in the claims of another existing patent. ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 882 (3rd ed. 2002).
56
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
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court granted the motion for summary judgment.57 The court also explored
the issue of willful infringement. Haldex claimed it consulted both
European and United States patent counsel regarding the Knorr-Bremse
patent. Citing attorney-client privilege, however, Haldex refused to present
any opinion letters.58 Dana, on the other hand, admitted to consulting no
outside counsel, but instead relied on the opinions of Haldex.59 Since
neither party presented any advice from counsel, the court, following prior
Federal Circuit precedent, concluded that had such opinions been obtained
they would have been unfavorable.60 Based on the “totality of the
circumstances,” the court found Dana and Haldex liable for willful
infringement.61 Both parties appealed the district court’s application of
adverse inference and the Federal Circuit accepted the case en banc to
reconsider the court’s opinion-letter precedent.62

B. The Federal Circuit’s Holding
The Federal Circuit issued its decision in the form of answers to
four distinct questions:

¶13

1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or workproduct privilege is invoked by a defendant in an
infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact
to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful
infringement?63
2. When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it
appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect
to willful infringement?64
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed,
and the adverse inference withdrawn as applied to this
case, what are the consequences for this case?65
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to
infringement be sufficient to defeat liability for willful

57

Id.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
61
Id.
62
Elliot, supra note 23, at 1.
63
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
64
Id. at 1345.
65
Id. at 1346.
58
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infringement even if no legal advice has been
secured?66
¶14
In response to question one, the court held no adverse inference
should be drawn when the attorney-client privilege is invoked.67 While the
court still recognized the “duty to respect the law is undiminished,” the
court determined “the inference that withheld opinions are adverse to the
client’s actions can distort the attorney-client relationship, in derogation of
the foundations of that relationship.”68 Every amicus brief agreed with the
court on this question, arguing defendants “should never have to waive the
[attorney-client or work product] privilege to avoid being subject to adverse
infringement.”69
¶15
In answer to question two, the court held that no adverse inference
should result from the mere failure to consult counsel.70 The court,
however, did continue to support the notion that potential infringers have
“an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent
rights of others.”71 The court’s holding appears to have been greatly
influenced by several amici curiae,72 only one of which advocated adverse
inference for failure to obtain legal counsel.73 The amicus briefs
highlighted the prohibitive costs associated with consulting patent counsel
for every “potentially adverse patent.”74

66

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1344.
68
Id.
69
Madeline F. Baer & John Dauer, Willful Patent Infringement, 804 PLI/PAT
883, 914 (2004). See, e.g., Corrected Brief of the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae at *2-3, Knorr-Bremse (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376,
02-1221, 02-1256) (quoting 01A|16D ABA Policy and Procedures Handbook p.
363 (2003)) (“The ABA opposes a blanket rule under which the failure of
defendant in an action for patent infringement to induce an opinion of counsel at
trial will permit an inference to be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or,
if an opinion was obtained, it was contrary to the accused infringer’s desire to
initiate or continue its use of the patentee’s invention.”), available at 2003 WL
23200567.
70
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345.
71
Id. at 1345-46 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d
1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
72
See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of United States Council for International
Business, et. al. at *6, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v.
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221,
02-1256) (“The en banc Court should overrule this precedent because this
principle of law places far to much emphasis on the presence of a litigationready opinion in the willfulness analysis.”), available at 2003 WL 23200563.
73
Baer & Dauer, supra note 69, at 915.
74
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345.
67
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With respect to question three, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to reassess the issue of willfulness without
admitting adverse inference.75 In doing so the court recognized the
importance of a balancing test to the finding of willful infringement, noting,
“precedent illustrates various factors, some weighing on the side of
culpability and some that are mitigating or ameliorating.”76
¶16

¶17
In response to question four, the court held that the existence of a
substantial defense to infringement would not automatically bar a finding of
willful infringement.77 According to the court, willful infringement depends
on the totality of the circumstances and the court has the discretion to weigh
various factors as it sees fit.78

III. RAMIFICATIONS OF KNORR-BREMSE
¶18
While the Federal Circuit clearly eliminated adverse inference from
the test for willful infringement, the court failed to clearly explain how this
decision would affect the current state of patent law, leaving patent
attorneys with two fundamental questions.

A. May the plaintiff inform the fact-finder that the alleged infringer
failed to consult legal counsel?
¶19
The Federal Circuit has previously acknowledged that the duty to
consult counsel is one component of the “totality of the circumstances” and
relevant to determining the potential infringer’s state of mind at the time of
infringement. In that respect the plaintiff must be allowed to inform the
fact-finder that the alleged infringer failed to consult legal counsel.
¶20
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse only addressed the
issue of whether the court may instruct the fact-finder to interpret the
defendant’s failure to present an opinion letter as indicating that any opinion
letter so obtained by the defendant would have been negative. The court
never addressed whether the plaintiff could simply inform the fact-finder
that the defendant failed to consult counsel. However, the Federal Circuit’s
prior jurisprudence strongly suggests a plaintiff must be allowed to inform
the fact-finder that the defendant failed to consult legal counsel in any case
where the defendant had a duty to consult counsel.79

75

Id. at 1346.
Id.
77
Id. at 1347.
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
76
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Generally, inventors do not have a duty to investigate whether each
product they develop has been patented because the costs associated with
such due diligence may be prohibitive.80 However, once an inventor gains
knowledge of a patent relating to his device, the costs of determining
infringement decrease dramatically.81 Along these lines the Federal Circuit
adopted the affirmative duty rule. In Knorr-Bremse the court continued to
adhere to the principle that a potential infringer “has an affirmative duty to
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing” when he has
knowledge of prior patents his product may infringe.82 While the court
originally required defendants to consult legal counsel in order to satisfy
their duty,83 the court currently only requires a defendant to consult legal
counsel if the totality of the circumstances warrants it.84 Consequently, a
blanket rule punishing potential infringers for failing to obtain legal
counsel, regardless of whether the circumstances require consultation, is
overly inclusive.85
¶21

¶22
In Knorr-Bremse, the court seemed to recognize the over-inclusive
nature of the existing rule. The court stressed that willful infringement
hinges on “whether a prudent person would have sound reason to believe
that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would
be so held if litigated.”86 In judging the defendant’s reasonableness the
court has repeatedly stated it must consider the “totality of the
circumstances,”87 one of which is whether the defendant reasonably
investigated the validity of any infringement claims.88
¶23
The question for any defendant becomes what is a reasonable
investigation? In certain cases where the inventor lacks any background in
patent law, the only reasonable course of conduct may be to consult a patent
attorney. In contrast, in cases where the inventor is well educated on patent
law, perhaps a large corporation that deals with patent issues on a regular
basis, a reasonable investigation may not include consulting counsel.
80

Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 420.
Id.
82
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (citing Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at
1389-90).
83
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
84
Rolls-Royce, 800 F.2d at 1109.
85
See, e.g., Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73 (making an adverse inferrence that
had the defendant consulted counsel the outcome would have been negative
despite failing to expressly find whether the defendant disregarded its duty to
consult counsel).
86
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1347 (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech.
Labs. Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
87
Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579.
88
CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1015 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
81
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However, in either case, whether the defendant consulted patent counsel
may be helpful in explaining the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the
infringing activity. Thus, in the interest of considering the “totality of the
circumstances,” it appears that the fact-finder must be told whether the
defendant consulted counsel because it is one component of the
circumstances and may aid the jury in determining intent.
¶24
While some may think this outcome simply sounds like adverse
inference in disguise, the results are much more just and favorable for the
defendant. Pre-Knorr-Bremse, if the defendant failed to present an opinion
of counsel at trial, the judge would instruct the jury that the defendant failed
to consult counsel and that an opinion letter, had it actually been obtained,
would have been against the defendant’s interests. Not only does the jury
learn that the defendant failed to pursue the wise course of action of
consulting counsel, but it is also instructed to presume that any legal
counsel, if consulted, would have said that the defendant was guilty of
infringement. Under such circumstances, it becomes almost impossible for
the defendant to win the trial.89 Post-Knorr-Bremse, however, the plaintiff
at most merely instructs the jury that the defendant failed to consult counsel.
The defendant then would have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s
charge of willfulness and explain why he did not consult counsel. Unlike
the old system, there would be no presumption of guilt and the defendant
would be permitted an opportunity to mount an actual defense.

B. How can potential infringers avoid a finding of willful
infringement in the absence of obtaining an opinion from legal
counsel?
¶25
In order to avoid a finding of willfulness, the defendant must
convince the court that he did not intentionally infringe the plaintiff’s
patent. A good faith intent, absent an opinion from counsel, can be difficult
to prove but not impossible. The defendant must present concrete evidence
showing he was aware of the plaintiff’s patent and took constructive action
not to infringe it.

1. The Federal Circuit’s definition of willfulness
¶26
Before turning to how the defendant may demonstrate a good faith
intent not to infringe, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the
concept of willfulness. The Federal Circuit has defined willfulness as a
89

In theory, findings by the court are supposed to be based on the “totality of the
circumstances.” However, a finding based on adverse inference has seemingly
always carried greater weight than the other factors and resulted in an almost
automatic finding of willful infringement. See, e.g., Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579;
Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73.
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form of mens rea.90 In other words, willfulness requires a showing of
deliberate or intentional infringement. The Federal Circuit has stated that in
order “[t]o willfully infringe a patent, the patent must exist and one must
have knowledge of it.”91 Potential infringers may obtain actual knowledge
of a patent in a variety of ways, including receiving an offer to license,
receiving a notice of infringement, or discussing a competing product with a
manufacturer.92 Constructive knowledge is also possible if the infringer has
knowledge of a product with a patent number affixed.93
As the court established in Kloster,94 and reaffirmed in KnorrBremse, a finding of willful infringement should be based on the “totality
of the circumstances.” The court must “look at exculpatory evidence as
well as evidence tending to show deliberate disregard of [the patentee’s]
rights.”96 Ultimately, the “court must consider factors that render [the]
defendant’s conduct more culpable, as well as factors that are mitigating or
ameliorating.”97 Although the relevant factors may vary greatly depending
on the case, the Federal Circuit has provided some guidance through its
prior case law as to some of the factors it may consider. One factor that
clearly weighs into the willfulness determination is whether the alleged
infringer consulted legal counsel.98 Consulting legal counsel, however,
does not automatically compel a finding against or for willful infringement,
but is merely one factor the court must consider.99
¶27

95

In CPG Products Corp. v Pegasus Luggage, Inc.,100 the court
identified three inquiries relevant to determining willfulness: (1) whether
the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s patent, (2) whether the
defendant reasonably investigated the validity of any infringement claims,
and (3) whether the defendant took remedial action upon learning of the
potential infringement.101 The court expanded upon the willfulness inquiry
in Bott v. Four Star Corp.102 by asking “whether the infringer deliberately
copied the ideas or design of another” and how “the infringer[] [behaved] as
¶28
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Heffan, supra note 6, at 119.
State Indus., Inc. v. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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Heffan, supra note 6, at 123.
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Id.
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Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579.
95
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341.
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Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 404 (citing Comark Comm., Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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Read, 970 F.2d at 826.
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Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579.
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Id.
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776 F.2d 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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Id. at 1015.
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807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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a party to the litigation.”103 Furthermore, in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,104
the court noted that the factors in the previous cases were not “all inclusive”
and recognized five additional factors courts could consider when
determining willfulness: “(1) Defendant’s size and financial condition; (2)
Closeness of the case; (3) Duration of the defendant’s misconduct; … (5)
Defendant’s motivation for harm; and (6) Whether defendant attempted to
conceal its misconduct.”105 Potential defendants must be cognizant of all
these factors because they may influence the factual determination.
Generally the defendant in a willful infringement suit will argue
that he created his invention with a “good faith belief that it did not
infringe” the plaintiff’s patent.106 Based on this defense, a finding of
willfulness will typically turn on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of
the infringement.107 Defendants, however, run into difficulty proving their
good faith intent because their state of mind is entirely within their own
possession.108 An opinion of counsel can be effective in proving a
defendant’s state of mind109 and, based on prior Federal Circuit decisions,
seems to be the preferred method of evidence for proving intent.110
¶29

¶30
However, as the Federal Circuit has previously noted, the weight
placed on the presence or absence of an exculpatory opinion varies based on
the circumstances.111 Ultimately, willfulness must be determined based on
the “totality of the circumstances” and not just one individual factor.112
While Federal Circuit precedent is heavily populated by decisions turning
on the presence of opinions of counsel, the court has issued a few decisions
that found the defendant not liable for willful infringement despite the lack
of an opinion of counsel. These cases provide insights into how potential
infringers may prove a good faith intent not to infringe despite the failure to
obtain an opinion of counsel.

103

Id. at 1572.
970 F.2d at 816.
105
Id. at 827. Omitted in the above list of factors is “(4) Remedial action by the
defendant,” which is a duplicate of one of three factors in the test articulated in
CPG Products Corp. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106
Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 85-86.
107
Taylor & Altemus, supra note 48, at 765.
108
Id.
109
Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 70.
110
Taylor & Altemus, supra note 48, at 768.
111
Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at 1125.
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See e.g., Mach. Corp. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a finding of willfulness by the district court based solely on the
absence of an opinion letter was improper).
104
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2. Proving a good faith intent not to infringe
¶31
One of the more common ways a defendant can demonstrate its
good faith intent is to provide evidence that he tried to “design around” an
already existing patent.113 According to the Federal Circuit, the ability to
design around an existing patent is a benefit of a patent system that ensures
a “steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”114 Because the ability to
design around is so valuable, the Federal Circuit has stated that “it should
not be discouraged by punitive damages.”115 In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley,
for example, the defendant refused to present any opinion of counsel at trial,
citing attorney-client privilege.116 Despite the absence of legal counsel on
the record, the court still determined the defendant did not willfully infringe
the plaintiff’s patent.117 According to the court, the factors influencing its
decision were “that the infringer’s copying of a certain feature was not exact
and that the infringer’s stated aim was to ‘design around’ the patentee’s
claims.”118
¶32
Similarly, in Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., the defendant
failed to obtain an opinion of counsel.119 Once again, the court was
favorably influenced by the defendant’s attempt to “design around” the
original invention.120 The defendant provided evidence that engineers
discussed whether its invention infringed the plaintiff’s, as well as evidence
indicating the defendant was conscious of the need not to infringe.121 This
evidence was sufficient to convince the court that the defendant “did not
intentionally copy the plaintiff’s patent.”122
¶33
Providing evidence that demonstrates an attempt to “design around”
an existing patent is not the only way to avoid willful infringement liability.
In Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Lomb, Inc.,123 the defendant did not produce an

113

At times members of the Federal Circuit have challenged the validity of the
experimental use exception, see Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring), which could have a potential
impact on the acceptability of attempts to design around if unlicensed copies are
utilized for that process.
114
Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 405 (citing Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control
USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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Id. at 1126.
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Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 406 (quoting Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at 1125).
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209 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Del. 2002).
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opinion of counsel at trial.124 Nonetheless, the court did not find the
defendant liable for willful infringement because the defendant abandoned
its infringing action immediately upon learning of the defendant’s patent.125
The common denominator in all these cases is that the defendants
were capable of presenting sufficient evidence of their good faith effort not
to infringe to convince the court that their infringing actions were not
intentional. This is likely the key to surviving any willful infringement
action. While an opinion letter may be the easiest and most accepted way to
accomplish this task, it is not entirely necessary to avoid a finding of willful
infringement if other external factors sufficiently demonstrate the
unintentional nature of the infringement.
¶34

CONCLUSION
While the total impact of Knorr-Bremse on patent litigation remains
unclear, a few results appear certain. First, a failure to produce an opinion
of counsel does not create an adverse inference against the defendant.
Second, potential infringers should be wary of the factors that contribute to
the “totality of the circumstances,” realizing that one factor is whether all
notifications of infringement by competitors have been reasonably
investigated. In certain cases reasonable investigation may require
consultaing patent counsel. Third, whether a court finds willfulness
depends greatly upon the circumstances of each case. What factors will be
examined and how heavily each factor will be weighted is left to the court’s
discretion. Potential infringers, when deciding whether the required duty of
care includes a responsibility to consult outside patent counsel, must
examine whether their current conduct convincingly demonstrates a desire
to avoid infringement.

¶35
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